

The Unfinished War: Korea, 1950-Present

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In the middle of the fiftieth anniversary commemorating the Korean War, the peninsula has become news in the context of U.S. national security policy, not once but twice. In his State of the Union address for 2002, President George W. Bush declared that North Korea was part of an “axis of evil” that supported terrorism. Later that year the proud boast of North Korean diplomats that their government was indeed building a nuclear weapons program in contravention of international agreements made many people worry about international affairs in East Asia anew. The problem: calling North Korea “evil” explains little. Although there is more than a little merit to this description, this label is an example of U.S. policy makers defining events in Korea from a Washington centric point of view with little knowledge of the Korean perspective or the history of that nation. Put another way: North Korea’s reasons for using terrorism are different than those of Afghanistan. North Korea and the United States have policy objectives that are in fundamental conflict with one another. The Koreans in the North want the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to be the sole government of the entire peninsula in fact as well as in name. Americans, on the other hand, back the claim of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to be the only legitimate government of the nation. The thesis of the account that follows is that the Korean War is not over. The hostilities started over the issue of which regime would govern the nation, and the conflict failed to resolve this fundamental matter. As a result, the division of Korea continues to be an active issue of policy.

In conventional accounts of the Korean War, the conflict starts on June 25, 1950 with the communist invasion of the Republic of Korea. The main idea of these works is that the war was the product of communist aggression. Bruce Cumings, a historian of Korea rather than U.S. foreign policy, had an enormous historiographical impact with his The Origins of the Korean War. He made the rather important point that the war that broke out in June of 1950 was the product of conflict between two different regimes claiming to be the only true government of the entire Korean nation. The end result: the Korean War was a civil war.¹

Understanding the civil nature of this conflict is of exceptional importance in understanding later developments during the war and in the years that followed, but it also can be misleading. International developments set in motion the various factions that would vie for control of the Korean peninsula. The result is what historian Jim Matray has called an “international civil war.” The collapse of the Japanese Empire, rather than the dawn of the Cold War, was the development that was most important in setting the stage for the hostilities. Various groups wanted power in post-occupation Korea. Eventually two claimants moved to the forefront. A communist regime in Pyongyang led by Kim Il Sung. In the South, Syngman Rhee formed the Republic of Korea under the mandate of the United Nations (UN), which the Soviet Union had agreed to in 1945 before deciding to back Kim.²

The Cold War soon imposed itself on Korea. The war of 1950 was an effort to unify the country through military rather than political means. North Korea made the initial effort, but this undertaking failed after the United States and fifteen other nations intervened. The major rationale for this involvement was a desire to protect South Korea from communist aggression, which was only half of the story. The ROK then made the second effort when the United Nations Command marched to the Yalu River. Chinese military intervention thwarted this attempt to unify Korea. The conflict soon became a slugfest. Neither coalition employed their full resources to unify the peninsula since the price of victory seemed too high. The hostilities in Korea might easily have mutated from a small war into a third world war. As a result, Korea would stay divided, and the root cause of the conflict would remain unresolved.³

When the shooting stopped, the nations of the UN Command realized that war might easily return to the peninsula. After the Geneva Conference on Korea ended in failure, these nations promised to come to South Korea’s defense should the North attack it again. The United States also signed a mutual security treaty with the Republic of Korea. These measures assured the South Koreans less than Americans might have expected. Many Koreans thought President Theodore Roosevelt had abandoned them to the Japanese in 1905. Rhee even told President Harry S. Truman that Korea was “sold to Japan.” The fear of another American betrayal would be a constant theme in U.S.-South Korean relations for many years.⁴

In the immediate aftermath of the Korean War, fate appeared to be on the side of the North. The economy of the Democratic People’s Republic was booming. The North met the goals of the five-year plan of 1957 in only four years. In 1962, the North had a trade surplus worth

\$95.5 million. In the mid-1960s, however, economic growth began to slow. During the seven-year plan that followed the five-year plan, industrial production averaged a still impressive 12.8 percent, but compared to the immediate past and to expectations of the future, this performance was disappointing.⁵ The South was a reverse image of the North during this period. The economy was faltering in the late 1950s and early 1960s and only started to improve in the middle part of the decade.

With this development, Kim Il Sung appeared to be facing a closing window of opportunity. The longer he waited, the weaker he became while his rivals in the South became stronger. Starting in 1966, the North Koreans began conducting raids across the military demarcation line, separating the two Koreas. Chong Sik Lee and Robert Scalapino in their study of Korean communism contend that these raids were a northern effort to induce an insurrection in the South like that of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.⁶

These attacks struck only ROK Army units. These incursions understandably enraged the South Korean military, and the ROK Army retaliated with a raid in the eastern portion of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). General Charles H. Bonesteel III, Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, was extremely upset about this operation. He tried to stop it, but when he failed, he wanted to believe that the raid was primarily the work of "hot-headed junior officers."⁷ The North Korean response was an ambush of an eight-man patrol from the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division. Seven of the eight died.⁸

For the next two and a half years, the Korean DMZ was an area of active combat. North Korean operations grew to include airpower, artillery, and amphibious landings. "There's a war here, too," one soldier remarked.⁹ Bonesteel quickly liberalized the rules of engagement for the soldiers in his command, which allowed them to fire directly into North Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also made U.S. personnel serving on the peninsula eligible for combat medals.¹⁰

The best-known incident in this "quiet war," though, was the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* in 1969. Showing an amazing ignorance of current events, the U.S. Navy sent this unarmed electronic surveillance ship without any protection to operate just off the North Korean coast in an effort to gather signals intelligence. Mitchell B. Lerner in his study of the *Pueblo* incident shows that leadership of the U.S. Navy was thinking in Cold War terms. The "rules of the game" allowed the Soviet Union to have its spy ships collect information on U.S. operations as long as these vessels stayed in international waters. American admirals assumed that the North Koreans would observe the

same understanding. The end result was that the North Korean Navy seized the first U.S. ship taken in peacetime in over 150 years.¹¹

Although the capture of the *Pueblo* is the best-known incident of this period, two other developments came much closer to starting a second Korean war. Two days before the seizure of the U.S. ship, a thirty-one man North Korean commando unit attempted to assassinate Park Chung Hee, the president of South Korea. Guards stopped the assassins only yards away from the Blue House, the president's official residence. A running gun battle in the heart of Seoul broke out and only one of the raiders survived. Park was understandably upset about this attempt on his life, and wanted to retaliate with force even if it provoked a larger conflict. President Lyndon Johnson sent Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance to Korea to make it clear that the U.S. was determined to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Vance recalled that Johnson "was terribly concerned that President Park might take some action in terms of a military move across the demilitarized zone into the North which could precipitate a war, and he made it very clear to me that President Park should be under no illusions as to the seriousness of any such action; and that if such a step were taken without full consultation with the United States that the whole relationship between our countries would have to be reevaluated." Park backed down.¹²

The second event that nearly brought about a war took place on April 15, 1969. The North Koreans downed a U.S. Navy EC-121 electronic surveillance aircraft flying ninety miles off their eastern coast. All thirty-one people aboard the plane died. The Navy, having learned nothing from the *Pueblo* incident, had no fighters or ships in the air to protect the EC-121. The new Nixon administration had to respond to this event. After long discussion with the National Security Council, President Richard Nixon had only two possible courses of action. He could order a retaliatory strike against North Korean air bases or he could continue the reconnaissance flights, but with armed escort. White House Chief of Staff H.R. "Bob" Haldemann recorded in his diary: "Probably will bomb the North Korean airfield." Although he favored this action, Haldemann thought it could easily bring about war.¹³ Nixon backed away from this course only when Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said they would resign in protest.¹⁴

The downing of the EC-121 was the last major event of the "DMZ war." North Korean raids slowly became fewer and fewer. The campaign failed because the Korean People's Army had had neither organization nor focus in its attacks. All told there were 319 Americans

killed in Korea during this shadow conflict. Yet, there were more American dead in Vietnam on a daily basis.¹⁵

Despite this defeat, time once again seemed to be on the side of the North, at least from the perspective in Pyongyang. In the mid-1960s Park sent ROK Army divisions to fight in South Vietnam. In the negotiations with the United States rather than South Vietnam that preceded this decision, Americans agreed that they would not reduce the size of U.S. troop levels in Korea while ROK units were in Vietnam. In 1971 with Korean soldiers still fighting in Southeast Asia, Nixon decided to remove one of the two U.S. infantry divisions stationed on the peninsula. This move was in keeping with the Nixon doctrine, which required that Asian nations provide the bulk of the manpower required for their own defense while the U.S. provided economic and military assistance. But from the Korean perspective, northern or southern, this policy looked like the U.S. was beginning to pull out from the peninsula.¹⁶

With the U.S. in full retreat from Vietnam, the North began making efforts to initiate a second Korean war. Kim even told New York Times reporters, "We frankly tell you, we are always making preparations for war. We do not conceal this matter."¹⁷

Actually the North was burying these efforts, literally. Starting in November 1973 the UN Command began to suspect that the communists were drilling tunnels under the DMZ. After a year of putting seismic instruments in place, a ROK Army patrol discovered a tunnel accidentally when they saw steam rising among high grass. The tunnel was four feet high and three feet wide reinforced with concrete slabs. The U.S. military estimated that 500-700 men could get through the tunnel in an hour and would be south of established U.S. and ROK positions. Three months later the UN Command found a second tunnel using exploratory drilling. In most parts this tunnel was over six feet high and roughly four feet wide. American military officials estimated that in one hour 10,000 men with light artillery could transit this underground road.¹⁸

While their engineers worked, the Korean People's Liberation Army grew. According to an official U.S. Army study, the middle part of the 1970s was a period of "remarkable North Korean Army growth." Americans estimated that the North Koreans had twenty-three infantry divisions. Kim told Chinese officials that there would be "no problem" in invading the South.¹⁹

The developments under and north of the DMZ clearly worried the U.S. military. American strategists were spending more time developing defensive plans for a response to a full scale attack across the

military demarcation line. A huge factor complicating these arrangements was the fact that Seoul was only thirty some odd miles away from the DMZ, and that the city had about forty percent of the South's population. Trading space for time was not a real option. As a result, the planners developed the strategy of "forward defense." According to this plan, the United Nations Command would respond to a communist attack, with a wall of flame and steel. The U.S.-ROK armies and air forces would drop a sustained volume of ordinance on the advancing North Koreans. The intense barrage would destroy the invading force in 10 days.²⁰

Many in the Washington defense community opposed this plan. One official from the Department of Defense called the plan "startling in its concept and disconcerting in some of its effects." Objections included the fact that instead of defending in depth the plan required the rigid holding of positions that lacked hard fortifications, the massive use of U.S. artillery and air assets at a rate that would consume forty-five day stockpiles in a week. A constant complaint Defense Department officials made was that UN Command plans were out of step with the Nixon doctrine.²¹

One of the biggest supporters of forward defense was General Richard G. Stilwell, Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command. "In enunciating the Forward Defense Concept, I have been guilty of stressing only one of the two essentials; namely the firepower of artillery and air. What has been muted is that that firepower can only be effective if harnessed to the strongly entrenched, disciplined, motivated infantry battalions of the ROK Army with their arsenal of mortars, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, rifles and bayonets." The role of the heavy firepower was to make the job of ground soldiers easier. "It is axiomatic that the greater the damage done to the attackers' maneuver units before they close, and the more effective our counterbattery efforts, the easier will be the task of the ROK infantry."²²

Other than the seizure of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*, the episode between the U.S. and North Korea in the years since 1953 that has garnered the most attention was the "axe incident" of 1976. On August 18, a group of U.S. and ROK soldiers set out to prune a tree that was obstructing the view of U.S. observation posts in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon. A North Korean Army detachment arrived and their commanding officer told Captain Arthur G. Bonifas to stop the operation. When Bonifas refused, the North Korean sent for reinforcements. When they arrived, the North Korean warned Bonifas, and then knocked him to the ground. Then North Korean soldiers charged the U.S. and ROK personnel, swinging clubs and metal pipes. A group of five or six North Koreans

gathered around Bonifas and beat him to death, hitting him in the head with pipes and the blunt end of an axe that the South Koreans workers had been using. Another group of North Koreans knocked Bonifas's deputy, First Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, to the ground and beat him to death as well.²³

Compared to the "DMZ war," the *Pueblo* incident, the Blue House raid, or the downing of the EC-121, the death of the two Americans was a fairly small matter.²⁴ "I don't think there was anybody in either the Embassy or the military who foresaw this as beginning a World War III," a Foreign Service officer later recalled.²⁵ Yet, many people in Washington thought that the incident might escalate into a war. The official response to the two deaths was Operation PAUL BUNYAN. The U.S. Army mobilized a huge force to cut down rather than prune the tree. Two eight-man groups of engineers equipped with chain saws and axes, and sixty U.S. and ROK guards armed with sidearms and pick-axes moved into the Joint Security Area. During the felling, the United Nations Command had an infantry company in helicopters and U.S. and ROK planes patrolling just outside the Joint Security Area. The U.S. also had artillery pieces in place ready to fire. After President Gerald R. Ford left office, Kim blamed the incident on him.²⁶

One of the reasons Kim took a soft line in response to this crisis, and why he never ordered an invasion in the 1970s was that the United States seemed to be on its way out of Korea. There was no need to antagonize the patron of the southern puppet state, as they were withdrawing. Such an action might reverse current trends in U.S. foreign policy. Kim had good reasons for thinking the United States was abandoning the South. Nixon ignored the pledge Johnson had made to Park. The Ford administration was considering a reduction in the size of the U.S. force stationed in Korea.²⁷ This move troubled Park and he often raised the issue with visiting U.S. officials of all ranks.²⁸ "By the time I had arrived in Seoul, which was July 1, 1976, there was considerable doubt in the Koreans' minds...about our reliability and our commitment to their security," Thomas Stern, the deputy chief of mission in the U.S. embassy, recalled.²⁹ During the U.S. presidential election of 1976, the nominee of the Democratic Party, Jimmy Carter made a campaign pledge to remove all U.S. troops from Vietnam. Carter's promise was in keeping with public opinion in the late 1970s. "There was no support in this country for a repeat of the 1950 history," Stern remarked. "So Carter was in some respects playing to his audience."³⁰

The national security bureaucracy in Washington began debating the issue almost immediately after Carter's inauguration. After being in

office for less than a week, the new President authorized a review of U.S. foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula, which might include the reduction of U.S. forces. Although the language of the memorandum is neutral in tone, Carter administration officials recall that the decision had already been made. Indeed, in a handwritten note, dated March 5, Carter declared: "American forces will be withdrawn." Two months later, he made his position official. "I direct that:—The U.S. 2nd Division and supporting elements shall be gradually withdrawn from Korea."³¹

Most people familiar with the situation in Korea thought the idea was dangerous. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and many members of Congress were opposed to the initiative. "Yes, it was a lousy idea if you assume, as most everybody did, that the North Koreans were unstable and unpredictable," Stern said.³² Starting in 1975, intelligence analysts had initiated several large-scale reviews of overhead satellite photography of North Korea. The conclusion of these specialists was that the North Korean Army had a two to one superiority over the ROK Army in tanks. In fact, the North Korean Army was larger than the ROK Army even though the South had twice the population of the North. When the findings leaked to the press in January 1979, Carter authorized a new reevaluation of troop withdrawal. To everyone but Carter, the study was an effort to extricate the administration from a bad policy initiative.³³

The idea of withdrawal ended when Carter lost his bid for reelection in 1980, but the situation on the Korean peninsula remained dangerous. The North turned to terrorism in an effort to destabilize the Republic and bring about unification. The North attempted to assassinate Park's successor as president of the Republic, Chun Doo Hwan. While Chun was visiting Burma, North Korean spies planted a bomb in the roof of the Martyr's Mausoleum at the National Cemetery in Rangoon. A ceremonial wreath laying exercise was to have marked the start of a state visit by the South Korean cabinet. Mistaking the arrival of the South Korean ambassador for Chun's, a North Korean Army officer detonated the bomb. The explosion killed four cabinet members, two presidential advisors, and the ambassador. North Korean officials apparently thought Chun's death would result in a massive popular uprising that would bring down the Republic.³⁴

While the Korean peninsula was an area of active diplomacy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the immediate threat of war was largely absent. The situation changed in the middle part of the 1990s. Disturbed at the idea that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons, American and South Korean officials approved U.S. contact with the

North limited solely to that one issue in early 1992. Direct contact with the United States had been a long time foreign policy objective of the North since it considered the Republic to be nothing more than a puppet state controlled from Washington. Talks with the Americans would, therefore, undermine the legitimacy of the South. In return for this concession, the United States expected the Democratic People's Republic to honor an understanding it had reached earlier with the South that would permit United Nations weapons inspectors to visit sites in the North.³⁵

The situation on the peninsula started moving towards war when the U.S. and ROK militaries decided to renew Operation TEAM SPIRIT. The cancellation of this field training exercise in 1992 was a key concession to the North. Using the resumption of TEAM SPIRIT in March 1993 as its reason, the North ended all its contacts with the South, cancelled all military leaves, moved its senior military leadership into underground bunkers, and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. No nation had ever withdrawn from the treaty before.³⁶

What would follow for the next fifteen months was a series of direct talks between the United States and North Korea, and a war scare that was fueled by ignorance as much as it was by a dangerous state of affairs in Northeast Asia and an inept performance by U.S. officials. At the urging of ROK diplomats, a confused Clinton administration agreed to authorize direct U.S. contact with the DPRK. The diplomats worked out a brief, six paragraph statement in which the U.S. agreed to continue discussions and the DPRK agreed to not to follow through with withdrawal from the treaty.³⁷

The negotiations that followed in the summer of 1993 led the American news media to suggest that the Korea peninsula was on the brink of war. The North Koreans wanted to use the June statement as a step towards engaging in direct political talks with the United States on issues other than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While North Korean officials attempted to negotiate a broader agreement, they refused to honor previous understandings. The North refused to let UN weapons inspectors visit suspect facilities. It was at this time that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin gave a briefing to American reporters and said that seventy percent of the North Korean Army was stationed near the demilitarized zone, suggesting it was preparing to invade. There was nothing new about this information, but reporters with little knowledge of Korea wrote exaggerated stories. At the end of the month, South Korean President Kim Young Sam arrived at the White House and made it clear that Koreans, not Americans, would decide the fate of Korea. Parts of the political talks that U.S. diplomats were considering would be

negotiated between Seoul and Pyongyang, rather than Washington and Pyongyang. Clinton, stunned at Kim's position, quickly agreed that the exchange of envoys to discuss unification between the Korean governments would be a requirement before U.S. and the DPRK representatives would meet again.³⁸ The North resented the requirement that they, the only true government of Korea, had to negotiate with the American puppets before they could hold more meaningful discussions with the real power.

Between January and June of 1994, many in Washington thought they were slowly moving towards war. In January, the ROK Defense Ministry announced that TEAM SPIRIT 1994 would go forward. In response, the North once again threatened to accelerate its nuclear weapons program. After repeated stops and starts, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported to the UN that it was no longer certain about the location of nuclear material in the North. Afterwards, many U.S. officials based in Washington told journalist Don Oberdorfer that they thought the situation could escalate into war. Yet, at the time, General Gary Luck, the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, told Oberdorfer that his main mission was still deterrence.³⁹

An examination of combat assets in Korea at the time suggests that an alarmist view of the situation is misleading. Much has been made about the deployment of extra heavy tanks, attack helicopters, and the arrival of new troops to bring the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division up to its authorized manpower. It is important to note that these actions had their impact at the tactical level, and were hardly the strategic moves of a nation reading for war. More to the point, syndicated defense affairs columnist David Hackworth spent a month in Korea visiting front-line U.S. units and found none of them ready to fight. Hackworth was the most decorated American soldier alive with 110 combat medals, and was a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam. He knew where to look and he found no unusual preparations taking place.⁴⁰

Relations with the North reached a head in June. The issue in dispute was the unloading of spent fuel rods from the only nuclear reactor in the Democratic People's Republic. These rods could be converted into plutonium for nuclear bombs. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the North had enough material to make five bombs. President Clinton decided to seek UN Security Council sanctions against the North and began planning to build up the U.S. military presence in Korea. Clinton administration officials suspected these actions might provoke the North, but they were willing to risk war to keep nuclear weapons off the peninsula. For Washington, the possibility that the North might manufacture and sell nuclear

weapons was a threat that they could not tolerate; for Pyongyang, the uncertainty about its intentions was a great asset in diplomatic negotiations. The crisis ended when Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. President, visited Pyongyang. Carter met with Kim Il Sung personally and got him to agree not to expel the UN weapons inspectors and to temporarily freeze his nuclear program until the U.S. and North Korea held formal talks.⁴¹

The nuclear crisis came to an end when the U.S. and North Korea negotiated a settlement that was a treaty in everything but name. The accord called for the international community to provide the DPRK with light-water nuclear reactors. In return, the North would allow UN weapons inspectors to have full access to facilities in their country. There were also clauses about working to establish trade relations between the U.S. and the North in the future, possible North-South talks on unification, and an understanding that the U.S. and the North would take steps leading towards diplomatic recognition. Reaction to the accord was radically different in the two Koreas. In the North, the arrangement was seen as an important diplomatic victory. The DPRK had gotten the U.S. to negotiate with it directly, accepting its legitimacy. In the South, the agreement was unpopular. The United States had excluded the ROK from meaningful negotiations about the fate of the peninsula.⁴²

Throughout the 1990s, North Korea repeated what had proven to be a successful formula: present itself as a military threat to the international order to get important political, economic, and diplomatic concessions from the United States. In August 1998 news leaked that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency believed the DPRK was building an underground nuclear facility in violation of its previous agreements. The North Koreans agreed to let inspectors have access to the facility in return for 600,000 tons of food. In 1999 technical inspectors investigated the site and discovered that it was not suitable for a nuclear reactor. The North Koreans had driven a hard bargain in return for the right to visit a hole in the ground.⁴³

As long as Korea remains divided and as long as the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang claim to be the only legitimate government of the entire nation, the peninsula will be a dangerous place. This issue started the Korean War, although international affairs also played a part. In a very real way that conflict remains unresolved. Since this confrontation involves foreign affairs, the United States will be a voice in any settlement. American officials, however, have often defined events on the peninsula from a Washington point of view, ignoring the

history and perspectives of Koreans in both the North and South. Put simply, U.S. officials need to know that history matters.

¹ Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947; vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981-1990).

² William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 61-83; James Matray, "Origins of the Korean War," Lecture at Texas A&M University—Commerce, September 5, 2000.

³ Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1990), pp. 31-33; Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 73-74; Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 1950-1953, vol. 1, Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: The Australian War Memorial, 1981), pp. 1-50; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 348-370.

⁴ "Text of Draft U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, August 7, 1953, The Department of State Bulletin, August 17, 1953, vol. 29, 204; "Geneva Declaration on Korea," June 15, 1954, The Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, vol. 30, 973; John Edward Wilz, "Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?" Pacific Historical Review 54 (1985), 243-270; Rhee to Truman, May 15, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 6, The British Commonwealth, The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 1028-1029.

⁵ Mitchell B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), pp. 109, 112.

⁶ Robert Scalapino and Chong Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, The Movement (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 638n-639n, 647-653.

⁷ Bonesteel to Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 3, 1966, Folder: Korea Cables vol. 3, Box 255, Korea Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library.

⁸ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969," The Journal of Military History 64 (April 2000), 442-444.

⁹ The New York Times, January 29, 1968.

¹⁰ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969," The Journal of Military

History 64 (April 2000), 445; Daniel Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-69, Leavenworth Paper No. 19 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), p. 52

¹¹ Mitchell B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), pp. 2, 5-49, 82-86, 169-192.

¹² Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview II, 12, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library; Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969," The Journal of Military History 64 (April 2000), 447-452.

¹³ H.R. Haldemann, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House—The Complete Multimedia Edition (Santa Monica, California: Sony Electronic Publishing, 1994) entries for April 16 and 17, 1969.

¹⁴ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Quiet War: Combat Operations Along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1966-1969," The Journal of Military History 64 (April 2000), 456.

¹⁵ Daniel Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-69, Leavenworth Paper No. 19 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), pp. 111-112.

¹⁶ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 13; William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), p. 68; Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "In the Service of Pharaoh? The United States and the Deployment of Korean Troops in Vietnam, 1965-1968," Pacific Historical Review 68 (August 1999), 434-441.

¹⁷ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 48; The New York Times, May 31, 1972.

¹⁸ ROK Minister of Defense to U.S. Secretary of Defense, November 29, 1974; Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command to Commanding General, First ROK Army and Commanding General, I Corps, November 18, 1974, Folder: Material on Tunnels in Korean DMZ, Box 1973-1975, Papers of Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army Military History Institute; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 56-59.

¹⁹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 59-61, 63-64.

²⁰ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 62.

²¹ John Tillson, Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan, March 7, 1975; Memorandum for Record, March 31, 1975; Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan, March 31, 1975, Folder: Materials on Forward Defense of Korea, Box 1976, Papers of Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

²² Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command to Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 12, 1976, Folder: Materials on Forward Defense of Korea, Box 1976, Papers of Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

²³ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 74-75; John K. Singlaub with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Solider in the Twentieth Century (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 358-379

²⁴ Not, of course, to the families of the two men. In his book on the West Point class of 1966, Rick Atkinson discusses the impact the captain's death had on Bonifas family. Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 427-436, 442-443, 518-520, 531. Atkinson also offers up a character sketch of Bonifas the man, see pages 69-76, 108-112, and 423. No one has of yet written an account about Barrett as a person.

²⁵ Thomas Stern and John T. Bennett Joint Oral History, 24, Association for Diplomatic Studies Oral History Collection, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

²⁶ John K. Singlaub with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Solider in the Twentieth Century (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 358-379 is a dramatic and somewhat embellished account of this operation in which he states that the U.S. was on the edge of war, but Lloyd J. Matthews in The Political-Military Rivalry for Operation Control in U.S. Military Actions: A Soldier's Perspective (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998), p. 40 fn44 has interviewed others that were present and suggests that the general has provided an exaggerated version of events; Don Oberdorfer using second-hand accounts suggest that many policy officials in Washington thought they were on the edge of war, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 76-83, 94-96.

²⁷ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 86.

²⁸ Richard G. Stilwell, Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting of the Chief of Staff, USAF with President Park, January 8, 1975, Folder: Memorandum of Meeting with Chief of Staff of U.S. Air Force with Korean President, Box 1975, Papers of Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army Military History Institute.

²⁹ Thomas Stern and John T. Bennett Joint Oral History, 9, Association for Diplomatic Studies Oral History Collection, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

³⁰ Thomas Stern and John T. Bennett Joint Oral History, 10, Association for Diplomatic Studies Oral History Collection, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

³¹ Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 13, January 16, 1977, available from the Carter Presidential Library web site at: http://carterlibrary.galileo.peachnet.edu/documents/prmemorandums/pres_memorandums.phtml; Presidential Directive/NSC-12, May 5, 1977, available from the Carter Presidential Library web site at: http://carterlibrary.galileo.peachnet.edu/documents/pddirectives/pres_directive.phtml; Carter note of March 5, 1977 reproduced in Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001) in photo section between pages 174 and 175. For Carter campaign statement and the attitude of the early administration see: Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, pp. 85-89.

³² Thomas Stern and John T. Bennett Joint Oral History, 16, Association for Diplomatic Studies Oral History Collection, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

³³ Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-45, January 22, 1979 available from the Carter Presidential Library web site at: http://carterlibrary.galileo.peachnet.edu/documents/prmemorandums/pres_memorandums.phtml; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 88, 93, 101-108.

³⁴ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 140-144.

³⁵ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 255-280.

³⁶ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 272-273, 279-280.

³⁷ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 281-286.

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- ³⁸ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 291-297.
- ³⁹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 301-303, 306, 310, 314-315
- ⁴⁰ The Austin American-Statesman, July 8, 22, 1994.
- ⁴¹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 306-336.
- ⁴² Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 351-359.
- ⁴³ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, new edition (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 410-414.